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CASENOTES
FOURTH AMENDMENT-FURTHER
EROSION OF THE WARRANT
REQUIREMENT FOR
UNREASONABLE SEARCHES
AND SEIZURES: THE
WARRANTLESS TRASH SEARCH
EXCEPTION
California v. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. 1625 (1988)
I.

INTRODUCTION

In California v. Greenwood,1 the United States Supreme Court
held that the fourth amendment 2 does not prohibit the "warrantless
search and seizure of garbage left for collection outside the curtilage
of a home."3 This Note explores the Greenwood opinions and concludes that the Court wrongly refused to recognize a reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage left for collection. This Note
reasons further that the Court created a confusing and disturbing
precedent by failing to sufficiently justify its conclusion that society
does not recognize an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy
in the contents of his or her trash receptacle, and by wrongly relying
on the false presumption that a citizen voluntarily surrenders his or
her trash to the collector. Finally, this Note concludes that, despite
the dissent's erroneous contention that trash cans are containers
supporting a reasonable expectation of privacy, the dissent accurately resolved the fundamental issue by concluding that society believes citizens may reasonably expect that the contents of their
garbage bags will not be searched and seized without a warrant.
1

108 S. Ct. 1625 (1988).

2 For the text of the fourth amendment, see infra text accompanying note 4.
3 Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at 1627.
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STATE BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution
provides:
[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supthe place to
ported by Oath or Affirmation, and particularly describing
4
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

The Supreme Court has traditionally held that warrantless searches
"are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject
only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." 5 In Greenwood, the Supreme Court expanded the exceptions
to the warrant requirement to permit the warrantless search of an
6
individual's garbage.

Greenwood came before the Court as a result of the unique posture of the California Supreme Court in excluding evidence obtained as a result of warrantless trash searches. Before Greenwood,
California was one of two states that had invalidated warrantless
trash searches as violative of the fourth amendment. 7 In 1971, the

California Supreme Court concluded that a warrantless search of
the contents of a defendant's trash barrel was an illegal search and
seizure in violation of the defendant's fourth amendment rights. 8 In
Krivda, the court held that an individual has a "reasonable expectation that [his or her] trash would not be rummaged through and
picked over by police officers acting without a search warrant." 9
The Krivda court accordingly suppressed the evidence obtained
from the illegal garbage search. 10
In response to the State's petition for a writ of certiorari, the
United States Supreme Court remanded Krivda to the California
4 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

5 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)(footnotes omitted). See infra notes
108-113 and accompanying text. See alsoJ. HADDAD,J. ZAGEL, G. STARKMAN & W. BAUER,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 246 (3d ed. 1987)("[T]he Supreme Court has frequently interpreted the reasonableness clause of the Fourth Amendment so as to make searches
under warrants the rule and warrantless searches the exception"). Exceptions to the
warrant requirement include: searches incident to a valid arrest, "consent searches,
emergency searches, searches of vehicles stopped in transit, seizures under the plain
view doctrine, searches and seizures in open fields, and seizures of abandoned property." J. HADDAD, J. ZAGEL, G. STARKMAN & W. BAUER, supra, at 246-47.
6 Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at 1627.
7 California and Hawaii appear to be the only states that had invalidated trash
searches prior to Greenwood. See People v. Krivda, 5 Cal. 3d 357, 486 P.2d 1262, 96 Cal.
Rptr. 62 (1971); State v. Tanaka, 67 Haw. 658, 701 P.2d 1274 (1985).
8 Krivda, 5 Cal. 3d 357, 486 P.2d 1262, 96 Cal. Rptr. 62 (1971).
9 Id. at 367, 486 P.2d at 1268, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 68.
10 Id., 486 P.2d at 1269, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 69.
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Supreme Court to establish whether the lower court's holding was
based on federal or state grounds.1 1 On remand, the California
Supreme Court explicitly stated that its application of the exclusionary rule to warrantless garbage searches was valid because it was
based upon both the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution and a comparable California constitutional provision.' 2
In 1985, California enacted Proposition 8, which disallowed the
suppression of evidence obtained in violation of the California constitution.13 Shortly thereafter, the California Court of Appeals faced
a similar issue in People v. Rooney.14 In Rooney, the appellate court
refused to consider evidence obtained in a trash search on the
ground that Krivda clearly held that warrantless searches of trash
without probable cause violated both the California and federal constitutions.' 5 The California Supreme Court denied review, and the
6
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.'
However, the Supreme Court subsequently dismissed its grant
of certiorari in Rooney as improvidently granted.' 7 The Court concluded that the procedural posture of Rooney was such that the
search and seizure issue was not properly presented to the California Supreme Court for review.' 8 Instead, the Court observed that
"[g]iving the California Supreme Court an opportunity to consider
the issue in a case that properly raises it is a compelling reason for
us to dismiss this petition."' 19
The California Supreme Court was afforded the opportunity to
review its Krivda holding when the State appealed the appellate
11 California v. Krivda, 409 U.S. 33 (1972).
12 People v. Krivda, 8 Cal. 3d 623, 624, 504 P.2d 457, 105 Cal. Rptr. 521, cert. denied,
California v. Krivda, 412 U.S. 919 (1973).
13 People v. Greenwood, 182 Cal. App. 3d 729, 734, 227 Cal. Rptr. 539, 541 (4th
Dist. 1986). Proposition 8 states that "relevant evidence shall not be excluded in any
criminal proceeding." CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(d).
14 175 Cal. App. 3d 634, 221 Cal. Rptr. 49 (2d Dist. 1985).
15 Id. at 644, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 55.
16 California v. Rooney, 479 U.S. 881 (1986).
17 California v. Rooney, 107 S.Ct. 2852 (1987).
18 Id. at 2855. The Court explained:
It is no answer to say that the California Supreme Court already had its chance to
review the matter and declined to do so when it denied the State's petition for review in this case. The denial of review may well have been based on that court's
recognizing, as we now do, that the prosecution won below, and was therefore not
in a position to appeal.
Id. Justice White, joined by ChiefJustice Rehnquist and Justice Powell, wrote a dissenting opinion that advocated deciding the trash search issue. Id. at 2856-62 (White, J.,
dissenting). Justice White's Rooney dissent is discussed in detail in the following pages as
it substantially forecast his opinion on behalf of the Greenwood majority. See infra notes
138-149 and accompanying text.
19 Rooney, 107 S.Ct. at 2855.
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court's decision in People v. Greenwood.20 The California court denied
the State's petition for review, 21 and the Supreme Court granted
certiorari to decide whether warrantless garbage searches violated
22
the fourth and fourteenth amendments.
III.

FACTS

In early February 1984, Laguna Beach Police InvestigatorJenny
Stracner learned from a Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA")
narcotics agent that a large U-Haul truck full of drugs was en route
to Billy Greenwood's address.2 3 Stracner and the agent searched
for the truck without success. 2 4 Later that month, a neighbor of
Greenwood's contacted Stracner to complain about frequent latenight automobile traffic in front of Greenwood's home. 2 5 The
neighbor said visitors entered the house but stayed only briefly and
added that a large U-Haul truck had been parked in front of Greenwood's house for four days. 26 On the nights of February 14 and 15,
Stracner surveilled Greenwood's home from 11:00 p.m. until 2:30
a.m. and discovered that four vehicles arrived and departed each
27
night, each visitor staying less than ten minutes.
On February 23, the same neighbor notified Stracner that a sec28
ond large rental truck was parked in front of Greenwood's home.
Stracner and an Orange County Sheriff's investigator responded by
going to the location with a dog trained to detect narcotics and con29
ducted a canine "sniff search," which yielded negative results.
Later on February 23, Stracner and the investigator followed the
truck to another residence, which Stracner learned had previously
30
been investigated as a narcotics trafficking location.
Sometime during February, Stracner began to "monitor and
search" the garbage Greenwood placed in front of his home for collection.3 1 At 6:00 a.m. on April 6, Stracner observed a man placing
20

182 Cal. App. 3d 729, 227 Cal. Rptr. 539 (4th Dist. 1986).

21 Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at 1628.

22 California v. Greenwood, 107 S. Ct. 1260 (1987). See also Petition for Certiorari at
4, California v. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. 1625 (1988)(No. 86-684)("Question Presented:
Do warrantless trash searches of discarded garbage violate the fourth and fourteenth
amendments?").
23 Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at 1627.

24 People v. Greenwood, 182 Cal. App. 3d 729, 732, 227 Cal. Rptr. 539, 540 (1986).
25 Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at 1627.

26
27
28
29
30
31

People v. Greenwood, 182 Cal. App. at 732, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 540.
Id., 227 Cal. Rptr. at 540.
Id., 227 Cal. Rptr. at 540.
Id., 227 Cal. Rptr. at 540.
Id., 227 Cal. Rptr. at 540.
Id., 227 Cal. Rptr. at 540.
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trash in front of the house, and Stracner told the garbage collector
that she wanted him to collect the trash and give it to her.3 2 The

garbage collector complied with Stracner's request and emptied his
truck's bin, collected Greenwood's trash and turned it over to
Stracner.3 3 Greenwood's garbage was contained in a dark colored,
opaque plastic bag that was sealed at its top.3 4 Stracner searched

through the garbage and discovered straws and baggies containing
narcotics residue.3 5 On the basis of these findings, Stracner ob36
tained a warrant to search Greenwood's home later that day.
When Stracner and additional officers executed the warrant on
the evening of April 6, they observed Greenwood, Van Houten and
another woman through the glass front doors of Greenwood's
home.3 7 When the officers knocked and announced their purpose,
38
Greenwood fled upstairs and one of the women ran out of view.
The officers repeated their announcement and, hearing no answer,
forcibly entered the house.3 9 The officers' subsequent search
yielded quantities of cocaine and hashish, and Greenwood, Van
40
Houten and the other woman were arrested.
Later, Stracner told Investigator Robert Rahaeuser of her findings and Greenwood's arrest.4 1 On three separate occasions during
April and May of 1984, Greenwood's neighbor again complained
about continuing late-night traffic in front of Greenwood's home,
this time speaking to Rahaeuser. 4 2 On May 3, an officer travelled to
Greenwood's home on an unrelated noise complaint and reported
to Rahaeuser that the woman he spoke with seemed quite nervous,
while several others within Greenwood's home peeked out from be43
hind the draperies.
The following day, Rahaeuser observed a man bringing garbage to the front of Greenwood's home, presumably for collection.4 4 Following Stracner's procedure, Rahaeuser obtained the
trash from the garbage collector and searched through the bags,
32 California v. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. 1625, 1627 (1988).

33 Id.
34 Brief for Respondent Dyanne Van Houten at 30, California v. Greenwood, 108 S.
Ct. 1625 (1986)(No. 86-684).
35 Id.
36 California v. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. 1625, 1627 (1988).
37 People v. Greenwood, 182 Cal. App. 3d at 732, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 541.
38 Id. at 733, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 541.
39 Id., 227 Cal. Rptr. at 541.
40 California v. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. 1625, 1627.

41 People v. Greenwood, 182 Cal. App. 3d. at 733, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 541.
42 Id., 227 Cal. Rptr. at 541.
43 Id., 227 Cal. Rptr. at 541.
44 Id., 227 Cal. Rptr. at 541.
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again discovering evidence of drug trafficking. 4 5
Greenwood and Van Houten were arrested and charged with
felony narcotics possession on the basis of the contraband discovered during the executions of the two search warrants. 46 However,
the appellate court concluded that, without the'evidence obtained in
the trash searches, the State had no probable cause on which to issue the warrants. 4 7 Greenwood and Van Houten moved to set aside
the information on the ground that the warrants and resultant dis48
coveries were the product of the original, illegal trash searches.
The magistrate at the preliminary hearing upheld the warrants, but
the superior court granted the defendants' motion to suppress the
evidence obtained under the warrants on the basis of the California
Supreme Court's holding in Krivda, which invalidated warrantless
trash searches as violative of the fourth amendment.4 9 The court of
appeals affirmed the superior court holding, 50 and the California
Supreme Court denied the State's petition for review. 5 ' The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine "whether the
Fourth Amendment prohibits the warrantless search and seizure of
52
garbage left for collection outside the curtilage of a home."
IV.
A.

SUPREME COURT OPINIONS

MAJORITY OPINION

In Greenwood, the Court 5 3 held that the fourth amendment does
not prohibit the "warrantless search and seizure of garbage left for
collection outside the curtilage of a home." 5 4 Writing for the majority, 55 Justice White observed that Greenwood's fourth amendment
rights would be violated only if he "manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in [his] garbage that society accepts as objectively
reasonable." 5 6
45
46
47
48

California v. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. 1625, 1627 (1988).
People v. Greenwood, 182 Cal. App. 3d at 731, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 540.
Id. at 733, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 541.
Id. at 735, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 542.

49

Id., 227 Cal. Rptr. at 542-43.

50
51
52
53

Id. at 736, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 543.
California v. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. 1625, 1628 (1988).
Id. at 1627.
Greenwood was a 6-2 decision; Justice Kennedy took no part in the resolution of the

case.
54

Greenwood, 108 S.Ct. at 1627.

55 Justice White was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor, and Scalia.
56 Id. at 1628 (citations omitted). This "reasonable expectation" of privacy standard
was first articulated by Justice Harlan in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(1967)(Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Harlan discerned a two part test to determine
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Justice White dismissed Greenwood's contention that he had
demonstrated an expectation of privacy worthy of fourth amendment protection regarding the garbage that was searched by
Stracner and Rahaeuser. 5 7 The Court noted that, while Greenwood
had placed his trash in opaque plastic bags on the street for collection at "a fixed time" and may have expected his garbage to be
"mingle[d] with the trash of others, and deposited at the garbage
dump," such an expectation does not result in fourth amendment
protection "unless society is prepared to accept that expectation as
58
objectively reasonable."
The Court concluded that, by placing his garbage in plastic
bags near a public street and thereby rendering it "readily accessible
to animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and other members of the
public,"' 5 9 Greenwood "exposed [his] garbage to the public sufficiently to defeat [his] claim to Fourth Amendment protection." 60
Justice White observed that Greenwood brought his garbage to the
curb "for the express purpose of conveying it to ...the trash collector," who might himself have sifted through the refuse or, as happened, permit other parties (such as police officers) to do so. 61 The
Court reasoned that Greenwood had no reasonable expectation of
privacy in his incriminating trash because he deposited it by his
curb, an area "particularly suited for public inspection and, in a
manner of speaking, public consumption, for the express purpose of
'
having others take it." 62
Justice White continued by observing that because Greenwood
had exposed his garbage to the public, the police officers could not
reasonably be expected to avoid seeing "evidence of criminal activ63
ity that could have been observed by any member of the public."
The Court went on to discuss its denial of fourth amendment prowhether a search invades a constitutionally protected "private area": "[F]irst... a person [has] exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.'" Id. at 361
(Harlan, J., concurring).
57 Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at 1628.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 1628-29 (citations omitted). Justice White cited anecdotal illustrations involving various types of characters, ranging from an errant canine to a "[r]ich lady from
Westmont," who "make use of others' refuse." Id. at 1628-29 nn.2-4.
60 Id. at 1628.
61 Id. at 1629.
62 Id. (quoting United States v. Reicherter, 647 F.2d 397, 399 (3d Cir. 1981)). For a
discussion of Reicherter, see infra notes 147-49 and accompanying text.
63 Id. at 1629.
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tection to telephone numbers dialed by a criminal suspect. 64 Justice
White analogized the dialing of a telephone with the placing of garbage by a curb for collection and concluded that in both cases, the
individual "voluntarily conveys" information to third parties, either
to the telephone company simply by using the6 5telephone or to the
trash collector by leaving garbage for pick-up.
Justice White explained further that people do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in that which is left open to public
view. Citing California v. Ciraolo,6 6 the Court observed that homeowners do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy against aerial police surveillance in their own fenced-in backyard because
" '[a]ny member of the public flying [at an altitude of 1000 feet] who
glanced down could have seen everything that these officers
observed.' "67
Justice White continued by describing how the Court's opinion
in the instant case comports with the view of most federal circuit
courts of appeals6 8 and state supreme courts 69 that police may con64 Id. (citing Smith v. Maryland, 422 U.S. 735 (1979)). For a discussion of Smith, see
infra notes 153-61 and accompanying text.
65 Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at 1629.
66 476 U.S. 207 (1986). Ciraolo involved a homeowner who claimed a reasonable
expectation of privacy in activites conducted in his backyard behind an opaque, ten-foot
tall fence. Id. at 208.
67 Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at 1629 (quoting Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213-14).
68 Id. at 1629-30. Justice White cited the following federal court decisions that reject
claims of privacy in garbage: United States v. Dela Espriella, 781 F.2d 1432, 1437 (9th
Cir. 1986); United States v. O'Bryant, 775 F.2d 1528, 1533-34 (11 th Cir. 1985); United
States v. Thornton, 746 F.2d 39,49 (D.C. Cir. 1984); United States v. Michaels, 726 F.2d
1307, 1312-13 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 820 (1984); United States v. Kramer, 711
F.2d 789, 791-94 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 962 (1983); United States v. Terry, 702
F.2d 299, 308-09 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom Williams v. United States, 461 U.S. 931
(1983); Reicherter, 647 F.2d at 399; United States v. Vahalik, 606 F.2d 99, 100-01 (5th
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1081 (1980); United States v. Crowell, 586 F.2d 1020,
1025 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 959 (1979); Magda v. Benson, 536 F.2d 111,
112-13 (6th Cir. 1976)(per curiam); United States v. Mustone, 469 F.2d 970, 972-73 (1st
Cir. 1972).
69 Justice White cited the following state court decisions: Smith v. State, 510 P.2d
793 (Alaska), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1086 (1973); State v. Fassler, 108 Ariz. 586, 592-93,
503 P.2d 807, 813-14 (1972); State v. Schultz, 388 So. 2d 1326 (Fla. App. 1980); People
v. Huddleston, 38 Ill. App. 3d 277, 347 N.E.2d 76 (1976); Commonwealth v. Chappee,
397 Mass. 508, 512-13, 492 N.E.2d 719, 721-22 (1986); People v. Whotte, 113 Mich.
App. 12, 317 N.W.2d 266 (1982); State v. Oquist, 327 N.W.2d 587 (Minn. 1982); State v.
Ronngren, 361 N.W.2d 224, 228-30 (N.D. 1985); State v. Brown, 20 Ohio App. 3d 36,
37-38, 484 N.E.2d 215, 217-18 (1984); Cooks v. State, 699 P.2d 653, 656 (Okla. Crim.
App.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 935 (1985); State v. Purvis, 249 Or. 404, 411,438 P.2d 1002,
1005 (1968); Commonwealth v. Minton, 288 Pa. Super. 381, 391, 432 A.2d 212, 217
(1981); Willis v. State, 518 S.W.2d 247, 249 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975); State v. Stevens,
123 Wis. 2d 303, 314-17, 367 N.W.2d 788, 794-97, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 852 (1985);
Croker v. State, 477 P.2d 122, 125-26 (Wyo. 1970).
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duct warrantless searches of trash "discarded in-public areas." 7 0° In
a footnote, the Court tersely observed that since "the dissenters are
among the tiny majority ofjudges whose views are contrary to ours,
we are distinctly unimpressed with the dissent's prediction that 'so'7 1
ciety will be shocked to learn' of today's decision."
The Court next rejected Greenwood's contention that because
the warrantless search of his garbage was impermissible as a matter
of California law, 7 2 his expectation of privacy in his trash should be
found reasonable as a matter of federal constitutional law and protected by the fourth amendment. 73 Justice White reiterated the
Court's view that societal understanding, not state law, determines
whether a search is invalid under the fourth amendment, and emphasized that in the instant case, the Court had already determined
that "society as a whole possesses no such understanding with re74
gard to garbage left for collection at the side of a public street."
Justice White concluded the opinion of the Court by dismissing
76
75
Greenwood's argument that Proposition 8 violates due process.
The Court observed that even though the Krivda holding recognized
77
a citizen's "right to be free from warrantless searches of garbage,"
California may amend its constitution to negate the Krivda holding
and "eliminate the exclusionary rule as a remedy for violations of
that right." 78 Justice White noted that the fourth amendment exclusionary rule does not apply "indiscriminately" and that "[the
Court's] decisions concerning the scope of the Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule have balanced the benefits of deterring police misconduct against the costs of excluding reliable evidence of criminal
79
activity."
B.

DISSENTING OPINION

Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, dissented from the
Greenwood holding and argued that Greenwood had a reasonable ex70 Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at 1630.

71 Id. at 1630 n.5 (quoting id. at 1632 (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
72 See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text.

73 Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at 1630.
74 Id. at 1630-31.
75 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.

76 Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at 1631.
77 Id.

78 Id.
79 Id. (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984)). The Court cited Leon as an

example of its cost/benefit analysis. In Leon, the Court held that the application of the
exclusionary rule to evidence obtained pursuant to a warrant should be determined on a
case-by-case basis. Leon, 468 U.S. at 925. The Leon majority refused to exclude evidence
obtained on the basis of a subsequently invalidated search warrant. Id. at 926.
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pectation of privacy in his sealed, opaque garbage bags. 80 Justice
Brennan stated that no court "before or since" has concluded that
Stracner and Rahaeuser acted with probable cause to believe Greenwood was breaking the law, and further that "[s]crutiny of another's
trash is contrary to commonly accepted notions of civilized
8
behavior." '
Justice Brennan elected to emphasize the nature of the
container in which Greenwood placed his trash. Quoting United
States v. Jacobsen,8 2 the dissent explained that " '[a] container which
can support a reasonable expectation of privacy may not be
searched, even on probable cause, without a warrant.' "83 Justice
Brennan traced this proposition back a century, to when the Court
observed that when a package is "closed against inspection," its
contents, "wherever they may be," come within the scope of fourth
84
amendment protection against warrantless searches.
The dissent also drew upon the Court's more recent decisions
in Robbins v. California8 5 and United States v. Ross 8 6 to conclude that
the fourth amendment protects the owner of any container that
hides its contents from plain view without regard to whether the
container is "worthy" or "unworthy," or made of leather or
plastic. 8 7 Justice Brennan cited other instances in which the Court

found a reasonable expectation of privacy in sealed containers such
as a 200 pound "double-locked footlocker," 88 an unlocked suitcase, 8 9 a totebag, 90 and "packages wrapped in green opaque
80 Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at 1633 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
81 Id. at 1631-32 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
82 466 U.S. 109 (1984)(federal agents did not violate a reasonable expectation of
privacy by searching and seizing contents of damaged, unsealed mailing tube that had
already been opened by private carrier).
83 Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at 1637 (Brennan,J., dissenting)(quotingacobsen, 466 U.S. at

120 n.17).
84 Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at 1632 (BrennanJ., dissenting)(quoting ExparteJackson,96
U.S. 727, 733 (1877)(establishing that letters and sealed packages in the mails are subject to the same fourth amendment protection as are papers in an individual's
household)).
85 453 U.S. 420 (198 1)(plurality opinion)(closed, opaque containers within an individual's automobile may not be opened without a warrant).
86 456 U.S. 798 (1982). See infra notes 128-133 and accompanying text for a discussion of Ross.
87 Greenwood, 108 S.Ct. at 1632-33 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
88 United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 11 (1977)(establishing that absent exigent
circumstances, a warrant is required to search locked trunk that has been removed from
its owner's possession).
89 Arkansas v. Sanders, 422 U.S. 753, 762 n.9 (1979)(establishing that absent exigent
circumstances, a warrant is required to search personal luggage taken from an
automobile).
90 Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 422 (1980).
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plastic." 9 1 Justice Brennan concluded that Supreme Court
precedent
leaves no room to doubt that had respondents been carrying their personal effects in ... bags-identical to the ones they placed on the
curb-their privacy would have been protected from warrantless police intrusion. So far as the Fourth Amendment is concerned, opaque
plastic bags are every bit as worthy as "packages ' wrapped in green
opaque plastic" and "double-locked footlocker[s]. "92
Justice Brennan dismissed the notion that Greenwood's expectation of privacy is less reasonable because he used the bags to dispose of, rather than to transport, his belongings. 9 3 The dissent
observed that a garbage bag is " 'a common repository for one's
personal effects' "94 and its contents reveal intimate details about its
owner's personal habits. 9 5
The dissent attacked the majority's use of federal and state
court precedent in demonstrating the widespread acceptability of
unwarranted trash searches. Justice Brennan observed that, of the
eleven federal court decisions cited by the majority, "at least two are
factually or legally distinguishable ... and seven rely entirely or almost entirely on an abandonment theory ... [which] the Court has
discredited." 96 Justice Brennan curtly noted that "[a] reading of the
Court's collection of state court cases reveals an equally unimpres97
sive pattern."
Finally, Justice Brennan argued that a "reasonable expectation"
of privacy in one's sealed trash containers is an understanding
shared by society. 98 For example, he cited the public criticism surrounding a reporter who searched through Henry Kissinger's
trash 9 9 and municipal ordinances that prohibit unauthorized persons from searching through garbage cans.' 0 0
The dissent explained that the fourth amendment does not protect objects which have already become public, such as trash that has
91 Id.

92 Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at 1633 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Robbins, 453 U.S. at
420, and Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 11).
93 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
94 Id at 1634 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Sanders, 422 U.S. at 762).
95 Id. at 1634 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
96 Id. at 1633-34 n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting). For a citation of all eleven decisions,
see supra note 68. For a discussion of how seven of'these cases rely upon abandonment,
see infra note 145.
97 Id. at 1634 n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The state court cases Justice White cited
are listed supra note 69.
98 Id. at 1635 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
99 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting)(citing N.Y. Times, July 9, 1975, at Al, col. 8).
100 Id. at 1635 (Brennan, J., dissenting). For an example of such an ordinance, see
infra note 103.
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been strewn on the sidewalk.1 0 1 However, Justice Brennan stated
that "[t]he mere possibility that unwelcome meddlers might open and
rummage through the containers does not negate the expectation of
privacy in its contents any more than the possibility of a burglary
10 2
negates an expectation of privacy in the home."'
The dissent contended that the majority's reliance on Greenwood's conveyance of the trash to the garbage collector is unpersuasive. First, Justice Brennan noted that Greenwood had no
alternative under county ordinance' 0 3 but to leave his trash at his
curb for removal. 10 4 Second, the dissent observed that if "voluntary
relinquishment" was, as the majority appears to indicate, dispositive
of the privacy issue, "a letter or package would lose all Fourth
Amendment protection when placed in a mail box or other depository with the 'express purpose' of entrusting it to the postal officer
or a private carrier."' 1 5 Justice Brennan concluded that such a result is inconsistent with long-standing Court precedent.1 0 6 Justice
Brennan closed his dissent by remarking that the majority opinion
paints a grim picture of our society.... [as one] in which local authorities may command their citizens to dispose of their personal effects...
and then monitor them arbitrarily and without judicial oversight-a
society that is not prepared to recognize as reasonable an individual's
expectation of privacy in the most private of personal effects sealed in
an opaque container designed to commingle it imminently and inextricably with the trash of others. The American society with which I am
familiar "chooses to dwell in reasonable security and freedom from
surveillance," and is more dedicated to individual liberty and more
the sanctity of the home than the Court is
sensitive to intrusions on
10 7
willing to acknowledge.
101 Id. at 1636 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
102 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
103 ORANGE COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 4-3-45(a) (1986), mandates that one must
"remov[e] from the premises at least once each week [all] ... solid waste created, produced or accumulated in or about [his] dwelling house." Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at 163637 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan also noted that Orange County prohibits
its citizens from disposing of trash in "any other way." Id. at 1637 (Brennan, J., dissenting)(citing ORANGE COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 3-3-85 (1988) (prohibiting the burning of
garbage)).
104 Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at 1636 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
105 Id. at 1637 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
106 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting)(citing Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1878); United
States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984)).
107 Id. at 1637 (Brennan, J., dissenting)(quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S.
10, 14 (1948))(citations omitted).
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KATZ AND THE SOCIAL REASONABLENESS INQUIRY:

BEHAVIORAL

AND VALUE-ORIENTED RESPONSES

In his concurring opinion in Katz v. United States, 10 8 Justice
Harlan posited a two-pronged inquiry that has become the Supreme
Court's standard for applying fourth amendment protection against
warrantless searches: "[F]irst that a person have exhibited an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation
be one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable."' 0 9 In
Katz, the Court held that the Federal Bureau of Investigation's
placement of an electronic listening device on the wall of a public
telephone booth without a warrant constituted an unreasonable
search and seizure in violation of the fourth amendment. 110
The Katz majority explained that:
the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not
a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected."'I
In Greenwood, Justices White and Brennan agreed that Justice
Harlan's two-pronged test is the proper standard for determining
whether a search violates the fourth amendment. 1 2 Justices White
and Brennan agreed further that Greenwood fulfilled the first prong
of the Katz test because he manifested a subjective expectation of
privacy in his garbage. 1 3 Instead, the debate between the Greenwood
majority and dissent centered upon whether an individual's expectation of privacy in his or her garbage is socially reasonable.
Applying the Katz criteria to Greenwood,Justice White concluded
108 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
109 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Harlan's concurring opinion has frequently been accepted as if it were the binding majority view. SeeJ. HADDAD, J. ZAGEL,
G. STARKMAN & W. BAUER, supra note 5, at 435 n.1 (1987).
110 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 348, 359 (1967).
111 Id. at 351-52 (citations omitted).
112 Compare Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at 1628 (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J.,
concurring))(justice White stated that the garbage search did not violate the fourth
amendment unless Greenwood "manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in [his]
garbage that society accepts as objectively reasonable.") with id. at 1632 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting)("Thus, as the Court [majority] observes, if Greenwood had a reasonable expectation that the contents of the bags he placed on the curb would remain private, the
warrantless search of those bags violated the fourth amendment.").
113 Compare id. at 1628 (White, J.)("It may well be that [Greenwood] did not expect
that the contents of [his] garbage bags would become known to the police or other
members of the public."); with id. at 1633 (Brennan, J., dissenting)("Greenwood's decision to discard [his trash bags] ... does not diminish his expectation of privacy.").
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that Greenwood failed to demonstrate an expectation of privacy
worthy of fourth amendment protection. 1 4 Justice White reasoned
that Greenwood was unable to meet the second prong of the Katz
inquiry because society does not accept an expectation of privacy in
one's trash as "objectively reasonable." ' 1 5 Justice White explained
that Greenwood's privacy expectation was not protected because
Greenwood placed his garbage bags where they were vulnernable to
the possible intrusions of "animals, children, scavengers, snoops,
and other members of the public." ' 1 6 Furthermore, Justice White
added that Greenwood's trash collector "might himself have sorted
through [the] trash" or, as happened, allowed the police to do so.117
Justice White's reasoning indicates that he believes the Katz social reasonableness inquiry is answered by examining whether an individual's privacy expectation is currently subject to invasion. By
stressing the likelihood of Greenwood's privacy actually being invaded, Justice White framed the Katz inquiry in pragmatic terms of
actual probabilities.
The Greenwood dissent sharply criticized Justice White's probablistic justification for concluding Greenwood's expectation was not
"reasonable." Arguing that the mere chance that uninvited scavengers might rifle through the sealed trash bags does not eliminate
privacy expectations any more than the chance of a malevolent intrusion diminishes one's expectation of privacy in his or her
home, 188 Justice Brennan quoted Katz to emphasize that " '[w]hat a
person ... seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the
public, may be constitutionally protected.' -19
Instead, Justice Brennan postulated a value-oriented reponse to
the Katz social reasonableness inquiry that involves an assessment of
society's collective individual, intuitive beliefs. Justice Brennan developed this theme by describing what he perceived as a general reaction to trash searches: "[m]ost of us, I believe, would be incensed
to discover a meddler.., scrutinizing our sealed trash containers to
120
discover some detail of our personal lives."'
The social commentary surrounding publicized episodes of garbage reconnaissance confirms the accuracy of Justice Brennan's asId. at 1628.
Id.
Id. at 1628-29 (citations omitted).
''7 id. at 1629.
118 Id. at 1636 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
119 Id. at 1636 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Katz, 389
added by Justice Brennan).
120 Id. at 1635 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
114
115
116

U.S. at 351-52) (emphasis
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sumption. For example, when information-seekers searched the
trash of certain celebrities and politicians in a non-criminal context,
many observers expressed disapproval.1 21 If these commentators
reflect a broader societal view that public figures accustomed to
scrutiny should be able to expect that their garbage will not be
searched, Justice Brennan is correct in concluding that this social
mor should extend to all citizens.
Nonetheless, Justice White's assessment of actual probabilities
is more in line with the Court's recent precedent than is Justice
Brennan's value-oriented interpretation of the Katz test. For example, in Oliver v. United States,12 2 the Court refused to recognize as
reasonable an individual's privacy expectation in activities conducted in a fenced-in, rural field with posted "No Trespassing"
signs because signs and fences are not generally effective in prevent23
ing the public from gaining access to the fields enclosed within.1
Therefore, regardless of the veracity ofJustice Brennan's presumption that most individuals believe garbage reconnaissance is ethically repugnant, Justice White's Greenwood opinion implies that a
majority of the Court is unwilling to implement a standard of social
reasonableness that encompasses societal beliefs; instead, in determining whether an individual's expectation of privacy is reasonable,
the Court examines how members of society actually behave.
B.

THE FALLACY OF GARBAGE BAGS AS CONTAINERS SUPPORTING A
REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY

In his Greenwood dissent, Justice Brennan shifted away from individual and societal beliefs and behavior and argued that a reasonable expectation of privacy may be discerned from the nature of the
container the individual uses to store his or her garbage. Justice
121 Id. at 1635 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan observed that when a "tab-

loid reporter" published his findings from a search of Henry Kissinger's garbage in
1975, commentators condemned such conduct as "a disgusting invasion of personal privacy," Flieger, Investigative Trash, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REP., July 28, 1975, at 72, and
"indefensible .

.

. as civilized behavior ...

[unlike] the way decent people behave in

relation to each other," Washington Post,July 10, 1975, at A18, col. 1 (editorial). Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at 1635 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Other commentators have criticized similar exposs of celebrities' garbage. For example, in an article describing the importance of protecting expectations of privacy in
trash, the authors decribe how one journalist "surreptitiously snatched trash from the
garbage cans of various celebrities" and published photographs of his findings with interpretive descriptions of the stars' reading habits, finances and social lives. Bush and
Bly, Expectation of Privacy Analysis and Warrantless Trash Reconnaissance after Katz v. United
States, 23 ARz. L. REV. 283, 311-12 (1981) (criticizing Weberman, The Art of GarbageAnalysis: You Are What You Throw Away, 76 ESQUIRE 113 (1971)).
122 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
123 Id. at 171, 179-81.
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Brennan contended that the contents of Greenwood's sealed,
opaque trash bags should not have been searched on the ground
that they were containers which can support a reasonable expectation of privacy.' 2 4 Justice Brennan cited long-standing Court precedent to support his contention that "so long as a package is 'closed
26
against inspection,' "125 it may not be searched without a warrant. 1
Justice Brennan reasoned that the Court has recently reaffirmed this principle and rejected any distinction between contain12 7
ers "worthy" and "unworthy" of fourth amendment protection.
Justice Brennan stated that in United States v. Ross: t28 .
the Court, relying on the "virtually unanimous agreement in Robbins
...that a constitutional distinction between 'worthy' and 'unworthy'
containers would be improper," held that a distinction among "paper
bags, locked trunks, lunch buckets, and orange crates" would be inconsistent with "the central purpose of the Fourth Amendment....
[A] traveler who carries a toothbrush and a few articles of clothing in a
paper bag or knotted scarf [may] claim an equal right to conceal his
possessions from official inspection as the sophisticated executive with
the locked attach6 case." As Justice Stewart stated in Robbins, the
owner of "every
Fourth Amendment provides protection to 12the
9
container that conceals its contents from plain view.

Justice Brennan's reliance upon Ross to support his argument
that an opaque, closed container creates a per se right to fourth
amendment protection is both misplaced and misleading. The
holding in Ross directly contradicts this view by permitting the warrantless search of "compartments and containers" within an automobile legitimately stopped by police officers if the officers have
probable cause to believe that contraband may be concealed within
the automobile, even if "[the container's] contents are not in plain
view." ' 30 Furthermore, Justice Brennan's quoted excerpts from the
Ross opinion ignore or simply fail to include explanatory statements
that contradict his conclusion.13 For example, while emphatically
Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at 1632-33 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1632 (Brennan, J., dissenting)(quotingJackson, 96 U.S. at 733 (1878)).
Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1632-33 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
456 U.S. 798 (1982).
Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at 1633 (Brennan, J., dissenting)(quoting Ross, 456 U.S. at
822-23) (emphasis added by Justice Brennan).
130 Ross, 456 U.S. at 800. Justice Brennan's extensive citation of the Ross majority
opinion is particularly puzzling because he and Justice Marshall dissented from that
opinion. At the time the Ross majority rendered its decision, Justice Brennan joined in
Justice Marshall's admonition that "[t]he majority today not only repeals all realistic
limits on warrantless automobile searches, it repeals the Fourth Amendment warrant
requirement itself." Id. at 827 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
131 In his Greenwood dissent, Justice Brennan ignored the following footnote that ap124
125
126
127
128
129
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quoting the Ross majority's statement that "the Fourth Amendment
provides protection to the owner of every container that conceals its
contents from plain view," 13 2 Justice Brennan failed to include its
subsequent qualification: "But the protection afforded by the
13 3
Amendment varies in different settings."
In light of the Court's unwillingness to distinguish between the
traveller who carries his or her belongings in a wrapped bandana or
an executive with expensive luggage, 1 34 Justice Brennan may have
been correct in observing that Greenwood would have had a fourth
amendment right to privacy in his garbage bags had he been carrying them.13 5 However, Justice Brennan failed to adequately support
his declaration that Greenwood was entitled to the same degree of
protection even though he used the bags to dispose of, rather than
transport, his "personal effects."' 1 6 In contrast to the general intuitive thrust of his dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan's arguments
on the container issue did not address the fundamentally different
ways in which a person subjectively perceives the contents of his or
13 7
her garbage can versus the contents of his or her luggage.
peared in Ross that discusses the distinction between "worthy" and "unworthy"
containers:
If the distinction is based on the proposition that the Fourth Amendment protects
only those containers that objectively manifest an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy, however, the propriety of a warrantless search neccessarily would
turn on much more than the fabric of the container. A paper bag stapled shut and
marked "private" might be found to manifest a reasonable expectation of privacy,
as could a cardboard box stacked on top of two pieces of heavy luggage. The propriety of the warrantless search seemingly would turn on an objective appraisal of
all the surrounding circumstances.
Ross, 456 U.S. at 822 n.30.
132 Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at 1633 (Brennan, J., dissenting)(quoting Ross, 456 U.S. at

822-23).
Ross, 456 U.S. at 823.
See, e.g., id. at 822.
Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at 1633 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan explained that the contents of the
trash bags "[were] not inherently any less private" simply because Greenwood decided
to discard them. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan reasoned that "a trash
133

134
135
136

bag ...

is 'a common repository for one's personal effects' and... is therefore ...

'inevitably associated with the expectation of privacy.'" Id. at 1634 (Brennan, J., dissenting)(quoting Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 762 (the contents of a small, unlocked suitcase are protected by the fourth amendment)).
137 For example, generally no one wishes to be reunited with his or her garbage after
a trash collector removes it from his or her possession. In contrast, virtually every traveller hopes to be reunited with his or her luggage after surrendering it to a baggage
handler.

640
C.

SUPREME COURT REVIEW

[Vol. 79

THE UNSPOKEN ROLE OF ABANDONMENT IN DETERMINING
WHETHER GARBAGE RECONNAISSANCE IS SOCIALLY
UNREASONABLE

Though the Greenwood majority did not directly address whether
Greenwood's expectation of privacy was socially unreasonable because he deposited his garbage on the curb with the intent of never
seeing it again, Justice White had earlier discussed the application of
the abandonment theory to justify warrantless garbage searches in
his dissenting opinion in Californiav. Rooney.13 8 While the similarities between his Rooney dissent and Greenwood opinion are illuminating, 13 9 the most telling aspect of the Rooney dissent appears to be
what Justice White failed to incorporate into his Greenwood opinion;
specifically, his explicit rejection of the theory of abandonment as a
method of determining whether an individual has a socially recognized reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her garbage. 140
In dispensing with the abandonment argument in Rooney, Justice White reasoned that:
Rooney's property interest ...

does not settle the matter for Fourth

Amendment purposes, for the reach of the Fourth Amendment is not
determined by state property law. .

.

. The primary object of the

Fourth Amendment is to protect privacy, not property, and the question.., is not whether Rooney had abandoned his interest in the property law sense, but whether he retained a subjective expectation of
privacy in his trash bag that society accepts as objectively
reasonable. 141

However, the text of Justice White's Greenwood opinion contains no
138 107 S. Ct. 2853 (1987). Rooney involved the warrantless search of an individual's
garbage bag placed in a communal trash bin in an apartment complex. Id. at 2853.
Justice White contended that the Rooney search did not violate the defendant's fourth
amendment rights because "society is not prepared to accept as reasonable an expectation of privacy in trash deposited in an area accessible to the public." Id. at 2862 (White,
J., dissenting). See supra notes 14-19 and accompanying text.
139

Justice White recited some passages from his Rooney dissent almost verbatim in

Greenwood. Compare Rooney, 107 S. Ct. at 2859 (White, J., dissenting)("It is common
knowledge that trash bins and cans are commonly visited by animals, children, and scavengers looking for valuable items") with Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at 1628-29 ("It is common
knowledge that plastic garbage bags left on or at the side of a public street are readily
accesible to animals, children, scavengers, snoops and other members of the public.")(footnotes omitted).
Furthermore, Justice White employed many of the same citations in Greenwood that
he had previously used in his Rooney dissent. Both Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at 1629 and
Rooney, 107 S. Ct. at 2860-61 (White, J., dissenting) cite the holdings in Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) and California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986). For a discussion of Smith, see infra notes 153-61 and accompanying text; for a discussion of Ciraolo,
see supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
140 See Rooney, 107 S. Ct. at 2858-59 (White, J., dissenting).
141 Id. (White, J., dissenting)(citations omitted).
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reference to abandonment or his rejection of the abandonment theory in Rooney, although the petitioner in Greenwood presented the
14 2
abandonment argument to the Court.
The Greenwood dissent did not attack Justice White's failure to
acknowledge his earlier rejection of the abandonment theory. Instead, Justice Brennan quoted Justice White's Rooney dissent and
presumed that the Greenwood majority adhered to Justice White's
earlier logic and "properly reject[ed]" the state's abandonment argument.143 Nonetheless, Justice Brennan observed that the vast majority of the state and federal court opinions Justice White cited to
support his contention that "society would not accept as reasonable
[a] claim to an expectation of privacy in trash left for collection in an
area accessible to the public"'144 relied upon the theory that garbage
placed for collection was abandoned property and therefore not
14 5
protected by the fourth amendment.
Justice Brennan's criticism indicates that, after Greenwood, the
theory of abandonment has an unspoken role in determining
whether an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his
or her garbage. However, the Greenwood majority was unwilling or
unable to delineate the dimensions of this role. While his Greenwood
142 Brief for Petitioner at 13, California v. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. 1625 (1988)(No. 86684)("The act of placing trash out for collection constitutes an abandonment of the
trash to, at the very least, the trash collector, and constitutes an abandonment of an
expectation of privacy to anyone who examines it.").
143 Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at 1634-35 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
144 Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at 1629 (White, J.). See supra notes 68-69 for citations of
these state and federal court opinions.
145 Id. at 1633-34 n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan noted that seven of
the federal courts of appeals decisions Justice White cited "rely entirely.., on an abandonment theory that ... the Court has discredited." Id. (citing United States v. Dela
Espriella, 781 F.2d 1432, 1437 (9th Cir. 1986) ("The question, then, becomes whether
placing garbage for collection constitutes abandonment of property."); United States v.
Terry, 702 F.2d 299, 309 (2d Cir), cert. denied sub nom Williams v. United States, 461 U.S.
931 (1983) ("the circumstances in this case clearly evidence abandonment by [the defendant] of his trash"); United States v. Reicherter, 647 F.2d 397, 399 (3d Cir. 1981)
(quoting United States v. Shelby, 573 F.2d 971, 973 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 841
(1978))("the placing of trash in garbage cans at 'a time and place for anticipated collection by public employees for hauling to a trash dump signifies abandonment' "); United
States v. Vahalik, 606 F.2d 99, 100-01 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1081 (1980)
("the act of placing garbage for collection is an act of abandonment which terminates
any fourth amendment protection"); United States v. Crowell, 586 F.2d 1020, 1025 (4th
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 959 (1979) ("The act of placing [trash] for collection is
an act of abandonment and what happens to it thereafter is not within the protection of
the fourth amendment"); Magda v. Benson, 536 F.2d 111, 112-13 (6th Cir. 1976)(per
curiam) ("federal case law... holds that garbage.., is abandoned and no longer protected by the Fourth Amendment"); United States v. Mustone, 469 F.2d 970, 972-73
(Ist Cir. 1972) (when the defendant "deposited the bags on the sidewalk he abandoned
them.").
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opinion is silent on the abandonment issue, Justice White implicitly
endorsed the abandonment rationale in Greenwood by relying upon
the reasoning in United States v. Dela Espriella, United States v. Terry,
United States v. Reicherter, United States v. Vahalik, United States v. Crow14 6
ell, Magda v. Benson, and United States v. Mustone.
Justice White's dilemma involving the abandonment issue is evident even in his Rooney dissent.' 4 7 In Rooney, Justice White quoted
the Third Circuit's reasoning in Reicherter to reinforce the argument
that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in trash
discarded for collection outside the curtilage of his or her home:
"Defendant claims that ...he had a reasonable expectation of privacy
in the trash he placed in a public area to be picked up by trash collectors ....

A mere recitation of the contention carries with it its own

refutation.... Having placed the trash in an area particularly suited
for public inspection and, in a manner of speaking, public consumption, for the express purpose of having strangers take it, it is inconceivable that the defendant intended to retain a privacy interest in the
discarded objects.
If he had such an expectation, it was not
48
reasonable." 1
However, Justice White edited the text of the Reicherter quotation to
49
delete the court's reliance upon the abandonment principle.
The Greenwood majority inexplicably failed to justify or condemn
the view that an expectation of privacy in garbage is not protected
by the fourth amendment because the garbage is abandoned property. Justice White could have eliminated this confusion and incorporated abandonment into the Katz criterion of social
reasonableness by referring to the Court's previous observation that
property rights reflect society's recognition of an owner's right to
exclude others, and that "one who owns or lawfully possesses or
146 Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at 1629-30. See supra note 145.
147 Rooney, 107 S.Ct. at 2858 (White, J., dissenting).
148 Id. at 2862 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Reicherter, 647 F.2d at 399) (omissions by
Justice White).
149 One of the deleted portions of the Reicherter quotation contains a favorable reference to a Seventh Circuit decision based upon the abandonment theory. United States
v. Shelby, 573 F.2d 971 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 841 (1978). The italicized por-

tion of the following text indicates Justice White's omission in context:
A mere recitation of the contention carries with it is own refutation. Every circuit
considering the issue has concluded that no reasonable expectation of privacy exists
once trash has been placed in a public area for collection. The reasoning underlying these decisions is clear and persuasive. As stated by the Seventh Circuit in Shelby:
"The placing of trash in garbage cans at a time and placefor anticipated collection by public
employees for hauling to a public dump signifies abandonment." Having placed the trash in
an area particularly suited for public inspection and, in a manner of speaking, public
consumption, for the express purpose of having strangers take it, it is inconceivable
that the defendant intended to retain a privacy interest in the discarded objects.
Reicherter, 647 F.2d at 399 (citations omitted).
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controls property will in all likelihood have a legitimate expectation
of privacy by virtue of this right to exclude." 15 0
The Greenwood Court affords little guidance to state tribunals in
explaining why an individual has no socially recognized reasonable
expectation of privacy in his or her garbage. 15 1 If the cases decided
shortly after Greenwood indicate the course of future state court decisions, the most compelling explanation lies in Justice White's reasoning that a citizen who places his or her trash out for collection
forfeits any claim to a reasonable expectation of privacy because he
15 2
or she "voluntarily" conveys the garbage to the trash collector.
D.

"VOLUNTARY

CONVEYANCE"

TO THIRD PARTIES AS FORFEITURE OF

PRIVACY INTERESTS

Prior to Greenwood, the Court applied the Katz reasonableness
test in a series of cases that find a voluntary conveyance of information to third parties automatically precludes any protection of that
153
information under the fourth amendment. In Smith v. Maryland,
the Court employed the Katz rationale to reject a petitioner's claim
that the warrantless placement of a pen register to record numbers
dialed from his home telephone violated his fourth amendment
rights.154 Writing for the Smith majority, Justice Blackmun observed
that it is unlikely "people in general entertain any actual expectation
of privacy in the numbers they dial."' 15 5 Justice Blackmun emphasized that "[a]ll telephone users realize that they must convey phone
15o Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 189-90 (Marshall, J., dissenting)(quoting
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 144 n.12 (1978)). For a discussion of Oliver, see supra
notes 122-23 and accompanying text.
151 In a case decided under the authority of Greenwood, the Nebraska Supreme Court
merely echoed justice White's observation that "the overwhelming weight of authority"
dictates that a citizen has no reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage placed for
collection outside the curtilage of his or her home. State v. Trahan, 229 Neb. 683, 687,
428 N.W.2d 619, 622 (1988)(quoting Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at 1630). Without distinguishing the authorities relying upon the abandonment theory, the Nebraska Supreme
Court did not remedy the lack of clarity surrounding the abandonment's role in determining the scope of the fourth amendment.
152 See, e.g., Trahan, 229 Neb. at 687, 428 N.W.2d at 622 (quoting Greenwood, 108 S.
Ct. at 1629 (White, J.)(citation omitted))("[H]aving deposited their garbage 'in an area
particular suited for public inspection and, in a manner of speaking, public consumption, for the express purpose of having strangers take it' respondents could have had no
reasonable expectation of privacy in the inculpatory items that they discarded."); State v.
Manera, No. 87-221 (Ohio App. June 30, 1988)(LEXIS, States library) (citing Greenwood,
108 S. Ct. at 1628-29)("The [Greenwood] Court reasoned that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in items voluntarily left for trash collection in an area which is susceptible to open examination.").
153 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
154 Id. at 743.

155 Id. at 742.
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numbers to the telephone company, since it is through telephone
company switching equipment that their calls are completed," and
noted that most people are aware that the phone company records
156
numbers dialed "for a variety of legitimate business purposes."
The Court concluded that, even if a person believes the telephone numbers he or she dials will remain private, such a subjective
expectation is not within the Katz criterion of "one that society is
prepared to recognize as 'reasonable,' "157 because Supreme Court
precedent dictates that "a person has no legitimate expectation of
' 58
privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties."'
Justice Blackmun explained that one who uses a telephone "exposes" the numbers he or she dials to phone company equipment
and therefore "assume[s] the risk that the company [will] reveal to
police the numbers he dialed." 15 9
Justices Stewart, Brennan, and Marshall dissented from the
Smith majority on the ground that such a conveyance is not truly
voluntary. 60 Justice Marshall explained that "[i]mplicit in the concept of assumption of risk is some notion of choice .... It is idle to
speak of assuming risks in contexts where, as a practical matter, in16
dividuals have no realistic alternative."'
The Greenwood majority's use of the "voluntary conveyance"
principle is vulnerable to similiar criticism. An individual who
wishes to keep his or her trash reasonably private may be hardpressed for alternatives to "voluntarily" conveying his or her trash
to the garbage collector. For example, local statutes prohibited
Greenwood from burning, burying, or amassing his trash within his
home 16 2 and, though no such law was described in Greenwood, some
156 Id.

at 742-43.

157 Id. at 743 (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 361).
158 Id. at 743-44 (citing, inter alia, United States

v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442-44 (1976);
Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963)).
159 Id. at 744.
160 Id. at 746 (Stewart, J. dissenting). Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Brennan, observed that "[a] telephone call simply cannot be made without the use of telephone
company property and without payment to the company for the service." Id. (Stewart,
J., dissenting). Justice Marshall, also joined by Justice Brennan, remarked that "unless a
person is prepared to forgo use of what for many has become a personal or professional
necessity, he cannot help but accept the risk of surveillance." Id. at 2585 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
161 Id. at 749-50 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
162 See ORANGE COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 3-3-85 (1988)(burning garbage is illegal) and
§ 4-3-45(a)(1986)("solid waste created, produced, or accumulated in or about ... [a]
place of human habitation shall be removed from the premises at least once each
week"), cited in Greenwood, 108 S.Ct. at 1636-38 (Brennan, J., dissenting) and Brief for
Respondent Dyanne Van Houten at 34, California v. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. 1625
(1988)(No. 86-684).
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local governments prohibit citizens from disposing of their own garbage. 163 While an individual who wishes to keep a document private
might shred the paper into tiny, indistinguishable pieces, other
items one might wish to keep secret, such as contraceptive containers and prescription bottles, are not readily destructible.
Under the Greenwood holding, a person who complies with the
laws of his or her community by depositing sealed bags of garbage
on the curb for collection voluntarily reveals whatever "secrets" that
trash may contain to the mercy and discretion of the garbage collector or, in jurisdictions that do not prohibit unauthorized tampering
with garbage, anyone who happens to walk by. The Greenwood majority failed to acknowledge that if a citizen must break the law to
avoid voluntarily exposing the contents of his or her garbage can to
public scrutiny, the crux of the issue is compulsion, not consent.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Greenwood decision is a disturbing and confusing manifestation of the Court's continuing emasculation of the fourth amendment's warrant requirement. The core issue in Greenwood was neatly
framed by the two-pronged Katz test. Because it was clear that
Greenwood subjectively believed the contents of his garbage bags
would remain private, the essential inquiry in determining if the
search was constitutionally permissible was whether society accepts
that privacy expectation as reasonable.
The Greenwood majority's conclusion that an expectation of privacy in trash is not socially reasonable is based upon two unsettling
propositions. First, by arguing that the contents of an individual's
garbage bags should not be accorded privacy rights because such
bags are sometimes invaded, 64 the Court rests constitutional safeguards on the capricious actions of particular individuals. For example, taken literally, the Greenwood majority's analysis could
support the position that the information contained in computer
networks is no longer private in light of recent episodes of interception and tampering by third parties. Second, to support its conclusion that garbage placed along the curb for collection may be
searched without a warrant, the majority used a false, hollow notion
of voluntary conveyance to characterize a transaction between citizen and trash collector that is often mandated by local ordinance.' 65
163 See Krivda, 5 Cal. 3d at 361,486 P.2d at 1268, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 66 (1971) (citing Los
ANGELES COUNTY, CAL., CODE ch. 9, §§ 1611-22, 1681-91 (1971)(restricting the right to

collect and transport garbage to licensed collectors)).
164 Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at 1628-29.
165 Id. at 1629. See supra note 103 for an example of such an ordinance.
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Furthermore, the Greenwood majority opinion is confusing because the Court made an assertion about societal beliefs while
shrouding its conclusion in legal precedent. 166 The Greenwood majority contended that the vast majority of lower federal and state
courts agreed with its conclusion that society does not recognize as
reasonable an individual's expectation of privacy in the contents of
his or her garbage cans, but Justice White refused to acknowledge
that a concept of property law, not societal understanding, was the
dispositive factor governing most of these decisions.
In contrast, the Greenwood dissent directly answered Katz' social
reasonableness inquiry. Omitting his flawed attempt to equate garbage bags with containers such as suitcases and mailing envelopes,
Justice Brennan's opinion clearly stated his contention that society,
as an aggregate of individuals, believes that the contents of a person's trash container can and should remain private. 16 7 Whether his
contention about societal belief is right or -wrong, at least Justice
Brennan's dissent addressed Katz' fundamental inquiry about societal understanding in lucid, candid terms.
JULIE

A.

LINE

166 See id. at 1629-30. Justice White contended in his opinion that society does not
accept an expectation of privacy in trash as reasonable comported with the views of most
federal and state courts that had addressed the legality of warrantless trash searches. See
supra notes 68-69 for a listing of the federal and state court decisions cited by Justice

White.
167 See, e.g., id. at 1635 (Brennan, J., dissenting)("Most of us, I believe, would be incensed to discover a meddler ... scrutinizing our sealed trash containers to discover
some detail of our personal lives.").

